
Awesome SOC
An operational handbook and knowledge base to build, run and mature a SOC (including CSIRT). Covering:
- SOC basics
- detection engineering
- threat intelligence
- SOC metrics/KPI
- SOC automation
- AI use cases and best practices
- SOP (SOC playbooks)
Those are my view, based on my own experience as SOC/CSIRT analyst and team manager, as well as well-known papers. Focus is more on SOC than on CERT/CSIRT.
My motto is: without reaction (response), detection is useless.
NB: Generally speaking, SOC here refers to detection activity, and CERT/CSIRT to incident response activity. CERT is a well-known (formerly) US trademark, managed by CERT-CC, but I prefer the term CSIRT as it precisely refers to incident response.
Table of Contents
Must read
For a SOC
- SOC build:
- SOC training for interview:
- SOC management:
- SOC assessment:
For a CERT/CSIRT
- Global overview:
- CSIRT build:
- Security incident response management:
- Forensics:
- Incident response playbooks & methodology:
Globally (SOC and CERT/CSIRT)
- Processes and concepts:
- PAN, What is SecOps?
- Flavio Queiroz, SecOPS vs. OPSEC
- Shubham, Security 360
- Vilius Benetis, CSIRT, SOC, ISAC and PSIRT definitions
- Thomas Roccia, Visual Threat Intelligence
- SentinelOne, What is SecOps
- Purp1eW0lf, Blue Team Notes
- PAN, Security orchestration for dummies
- ThreatConnect, SIRP / SOA / TIP benefits
- Medium, Compromise assessment methodology
- Hunt.io, Threat hunting framework (PEAK)
- Incident response specific process/lifecycle:
- CSIRT build:
- Frameworks and materials:
- Security capabilities mappings:
- Threat matrix:
- SOAR solutions:
- NIS2:
- AI (genAI, LLM, agentic AI): monitoring, threat landscape, management:
- Management:
- SOP (Standard Operating Procedures):
Fundamental concepts
MITRE references
Prepare for handling incidents by defining incident categories, response steps, and escalation
paths, and codifying those into SOPs and playbooks. Determine the priorities of incidents for
the organization and allocate the resources to respond. Execute response with precision and
care toward constituency mission and business.
🔗 Dedicated page
Cf. SOC/CSIRT Basic and fundamental concepts.
MITRE reference
Choose data by considering relative value of different data types such as sensor and log data
collected by network and host systems, cloud resources, applications, and sensors. Consider
the trade-offs of too little data and therefore not having the relevant information available and
too much data such that tools and analysts become overwhelmed.
🔗 Dedicated page
Cf. Mission-critical means
SOC internals
MITRE reference
Consolidate and harmonize views into tools and data and integrate them to maximize SOC
workflow. Consider how the many SOC tools, including SIEM, UEBA, SOAR, and others fit
in with the organization’s technical landscape, to include cloud and OT environments
🔗 Dedicated page
Cf. SOC internals/core
AI
MITRE reference
Consolidate and harmonize views into tools and data and integrate them to maximize SOC
workflow. Consider how the many SOC tools, including SIEM, UEBA, SOAR, and others fit
in with the organization’s technical landscape, to include cloud and OT environments
🔗 Dedicated page
Cf. AI (ML, LLM, Agentic AI…)
IT/security Watch
MITRE reference
Tailor the collection and use of cyber threat intelligence by analyzing the intersection of
adversary information, organization relevancy, and technical environment to prioritize
defenses, monitoring, and other actions.
🔗 Dedicated page
Cf. Watch
SOAR
MITRE reference
Consolidate and harmonize views into tools and data and integrate them to maximize SOC
workflow. Consider how the many SOC tools, including SIEM, UEBA, SOAR, and others fit
in with the organization’s technical landscape, to include cloud and OT environments.
🔗 Dedicated page
Cf. SOAR
Detection engineering
MITRE references
Develop situational awareness through understanding the mission; legal regulatory
environment; technical and data environment; user, user behaviors and service interactions;
and the threat. Prioritize gaining insights into critical systems and data and iterate understanding
over time.
Choose data by considering relative value of different data types such as sensor and log data
collected by network and host systems, cloud resources, applications, and sensors. Consider
the trade-offs of too little data and therefore not having the relevant information available and
too much data such that tools and analysts become overwhelmed.
Enhance SOC activities to include threat hunting, red teaming, deception, malware analysis,
forensics, and/or tabletop exercises, once incident response is mature. Any of these can
improve the SOCs operating ability and increase the likelihood of finding more sophisticated
adversaries.
🔗 Dedicated page
Cf. detection engineering.
Threat intelligence
MITRE reference
Tailor the collection and use of cyber threat intelligence by analyzing the intersection of
adversary information, organization relevancy, and technical environment to prioritize
defenses, monitoring, and other actions.
🔗 Dedicated page
Cf. threat intelligence.
Playbooks
Based on experience, I propose a few SOP (Standard Operating Procedures), that one may want to call playbooks.
🔗 Dedicated pages
Management
MITRE references
Develop situational awareness through understanding the mission; legal regulatory
environment; technical and data environment; user, user behaviors and service interactions;
and the threat. Prioritize gaining insights into critical systems and data and iterate understanding
over time.
Empower the SOC to carry out the desired functions, scope, partnerships, and responsibilities
through an approved charter and the SOCs alignment within the organization
Structure SOCs by considering the constituency, SOC functions and responsibilities, service
availability, and any operational efficiencies gained by selecting one construct over another
Engage within the SOC, with stakeholders and constituents, and with the broader cyber
community to evolve capabilities and contribute to the overall security of the broader
community.
Enhance SOC activities to include threat hunting, red teaming, deception, malware analysis,
forensics, and/or tabletop exercises, once incident response is mature. Any of these can
improve the SOCs operating ability and increase the likelihood of finding more sophisticated
adversaries.
🔗 Dedicated page
Cf. Management.
SOC metrics (KPI/SLA)
MITRE reference
Determine qualitative and quantitative measures to know what is working well, and where to
improve. A SOC metrics program includes business objectives, data sources and collection,
data synthesis, reporting, and decision-making and action
🔗 Dedicated page
Cf. SOC metrics (KPI/SLA)
HR and training
MITRE reference
Create an environment to attract the right people and encourage them to stay through career
progression opportunities and great culture and operating environment. Plan for turnover
and build a pipeline to hire. Consider how many personnel are needed for the different SOC
functions.
🔗 Dedicated page
Cf. HR and training.
IT achitecture of a SOC
As per NCSC website:
Indications of an attack will rarely be isolated events on a single system component or system. So, where possible, having a single platform where analysts have the ability to see and query log data from all of your onboarded systems is invaluable.
Having access to the log data from multiple (or all) components, will enable analysts to look for evidence of attack across an estate and create detection use-cases that utilise a multitude of sources.
By creating temporal (actions over a period of time) and spatial (actions across the estate) use-cases, an organisation is better prepared to address cyber security attacks that occur system wide.
Disconnect (as much as possible) SOC from monitored environment
The goal is to prevent an attacker from achieving lateral movement from a compromised monitored zone, to the SOC/CSIRT work zone.
Enclave:
-
Implement SOC enclave (with network isolation), as per MITRE paper drawing:

-
only log collectors and WEF should be authorized to send data to the SOC/CSIRT enclave. Whenever possible, the SOC tools pull the data from the monitored environment, and not the contrary;
-
on top of a SOC enclave, implement at least a level 2 of network segmentation;
SOC’s assets should be part of a separate restricted AD forest, to allow AD isolation with the rest of the monitored AD domains.
Endpoints hardening:
- SOC/CSIRT’s endpoints should be hardened with relevant guidelines;
To go further
📚 Must Read
Essential resources to build, run, and mature your SOC/CSIRT.
Frameworks & Methodologies
Roles & Responsibilities
Threat Intelligence
Compliance & Regulations
- SentinelOne, EPP vs. EDR: Understanding the Differences – Explanation of endpoint security technologies.
- Wavestone, Security bastion (PAM) and Active Directory tiering model – How to reconcile PAM and AD tiering.
- Quest, Best practices for AD disaster recovery – AD backup best practices.
- Microsoft, Isolate Tier 0 assets with group policy – Guide to isolate Tier 0 assets.
- Gartner, Market guide for NDR – Market analysis of Network Detection and Response solutions.
- RecordedFuture - Role of OSINT tools, brief history, and how to use these popular tools to deliver crucial intelligence insights.
- MDRProviders.io, comparison of managed detection and response providers – Comparison of MDR providers by pricing, SLA, and breach warranty.
Use Cases & Implementations
📖 Nice to Read
Additional resources to expand your knowledge.
Standards & Controls
Incident Response
Benchmarks & Surveys
Miscellaneous Resources
SOC sensors, nice to have
- Deceptive technology:
- WAF for internet-facing websites/apps:
- MDM:
- (full-featured) Honeypot:
- Phishing and brand infringement protection (domain names):
- NIDS:
- My recommendation: Crowdsec, ftagent-lite for lightweight flow-based network monitoring and DDoS detection (sFlow/NetFlow/IPFIX, adaptive baseline anomaly detection)
- NDR:
- DLP:
- OT (industrial) NIDS:
- Network TAP:
- Mobile network security (2G/3G):
- My recommendation: Dust Mobile.
Harden SOC/CSIRT environment
- Implement hardening measures on SOC workstations, servers, and IT services that are used (if possible), e.g.:
- Put the SOC assets in a separate AD forest, as forest is the AD security boundary, for isolation purposes, in case of a global enterprise’s IT compromise
- Create/provide a disaster recovery plan for the SOC assets and resources.
- Implement admin bastions and silo to administrate the SOC env (equipments, servers, endpoints):
- My advice: consider the SOC environment as to be administrated by Tier 1, if possible with a dedicated admin bastion. Here is a generic drawing from Wavestone’s article (see Must read references):

- Recommended technology choices: Wallix PAM
- Implement a level 3 of network segmentation
- You may want to use throwable machines (virtual machines) for incident response or specific artefacts analysis. Here are my recommendations:
Appendix
License
CC-BY-SA
Special thanks
Yann F., Wojtek S., Nicolas R., Clément G., Alexandre C., Jean B., Frédérique B., Pierre d’H., Julien C., Hamdi C., Fabien L., Michel de C., Gilles B., Olivier R., Jean-François L., Fabrice M., Pascal R., Florian S., Maxime P., Pascal L., Jérémy d’A., Olivier C. x2, David G., Guillaume D., Patrick C., Lesley K., Gérald G., Jean-Baptiste V., Antoine C., David Q., Philippe M., …
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