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cyb3rxp/awesome-soc 是一个托管在 GitHub 上的开源项目,采用 Creative Commons Zero v1.0 Universal 许可证,目前获得 1.9k 个 Star、314 次 Fork。

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cyb3rxp/awesome-soc
开源许可证
Creative Commons Zero v1.0 Universal
Star 数
1.9k
Fork 数
314
未关闭 Issue
18

README 摘要

Awesome SOC An operational handbook and knowledge base to build, run and mature a SOC (including CSIRT). Covering: SOC basics detection engineering threat intelligence SOC metrics/KPI SOC automation AI use cases and best practices SOP (SOC playbooks) Those are my view, based on my own experience as SOC/CSIRT analyst and team manager, as well as well-known papers. Focus is more on SOC than on CERT/CSIRT. My motto is…

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README

GitHub stars Awesome Last Update License Contributions welcome Lychee

Awesome SOC

An operational handbook and knowledge base to build, run and mature a SOC (including CSIRT). Covering:

  • SOC basics
  • detection engineering
  • threat intelligence
  • SOC metrics/KPI
  • SOC automation
  • AI use cases and best practices
  • SOP (SOC playbooks)

Those are my view, based on my own experience as SOC/CSIRT analyst and team manager, as well as well-known papers. Focus is more on SOC than on CERT/CSIRT.

My motto is: without reaction (response), detection is useless.

NB: Generally speaking, SOC here refers to detection activity, and CERT/CSIRT to incident response activity. CERT is a well-known (formerly) US trademark, managed by CERT-CC, but I prefer the term CSIRT as it precisely refers to incident response.

Table of Contents

Must read

For a SOC

For a CERT/CSIRT

Globally (SOC and CERT/CSIRT)

Fundamental concepts

Concepts, tools, missions, attack lifecycle, red/blue/purple teams

MITRE references

Prepare for handling incidents by defining incident categories, response steps, and escalation paths, and codifying those into SOPs and playbooks. Determine the priorities of incidents for the organization and allocate the resources to respond. Execute response with precision and care toward constituency mission and business.

🔗 Dedicated page

Cf. SOC/CSIRT Basic and fundamental concepts.

Mission-critical means (tools/sensors)

MITRE reference

Choose data by considering relative value of different data types such as sensor and log data collected by network and host systems, cloud resources, applications, and sensors. Consider the trade-offs of too little data and therefore not having the relevant information available and too much data such that tools and analysts become overwhelmed.

🔗 Dedicated page

Cf. Mission-critical means

SOC internals

MITRE reference

Consolidate and harmonize views into tools and data and integrate them to maximize SOC workflow. Consider how the many SOC tools, including SIEM, UEBA, SOAR, and others fit in with the organization’s technical landscape, to include cloud and OT environments

🔗 Dedicated page

Cf. SOC internals/core

AI

MITRE reference

Consolidate and harmonize views into tools and data and integrate them to maximize SOC workflow. Consider how the many SOC tools, including SIEM, UEBA, SOAR, and others fit in with the organization’s technical landscape, to include cloud and OT environments

🔗 Dedicated page

Cf. AI (ML, LLM, Agentic AI…)

IT/security Watch

MITRE reference

Tailor the collection and use of cyber threat intelligence by analyzing the intersection of adversary information, organization relevancy, and technical environment to prioritize defenses, monitoring, and other actions.

🔗 Dedicated page

Cf. Watch

SOAR

MITRE reference

Consolidate and harmonize views into tools and data and integrate them to maximize SOC workflow. Consider how the many SOC tools, including SIEM, UEBA, SOAR, and others fit in with the organization’s technical landscape, to include cloud and OT environments.

🔗 Dedicated page

Cf. SOAR

Detection engineering

MITRE references

Develop situational awareness through understanding the mission; legal regulatory environment; technical and data environment; user, user behaviors and service interactions; and the threat. Prioritize gaining insights into critical systems and data and iterate understanding over time.

Choose data by considering relative value of different data types such as sensor and log data collected by network and host systems, cloud resources, applications, and sensors. Consider the trade-offs of too little data and therefore not having the relevant information available and too much data such that tools and analysts become overwhelmed.

Enhance SOC activities to include threat hunting, red teaming, deception, malware analysis, forensics, and/or tabletop exercises, once incident response is mature. Any of these can improve the SOCs operating ability and increase the likelihood of finding more sophisticated adversaries.

🔗 Dedicated page

Cf. detection engineering.

Threat intelligence

MITRE reference

Tailor the collection and use of cyber threat intelligence by analyzing the intersection of adversary information, organization relevancy, and technical environment to prioritize defenses, monitoring, and other actions.

🔗 Dedicated page

Cf. threat intelligence.

Playbooks

Based on experience, I propose a few SOP (Standard Operating Procedures), that one may want to call playbooks.

🔗 Dedicated pages

Management

MITRE references

Develop situational awareness through understanding the mission; legal regulatory environment; technical and data environment; user, user behaviors and service interactions; and the threat. Prioritize gaining insights into critical systems and data and iterate understanding over time.

Empower the SOC to carry out the desired functions, scope, partnerships, and responsibilities through an approved charter and the SOCs alignment within the organization

Structure SOCs by considering the constituency, SOC functions and responsibilities, service availability, and any operational efficiencies gained by selecting one construct over another

Engage within the SOC, with stakeholders and constituents, and with the broader cyber community to evolve capabilities and contribute to the overall security of the broader community.

Enhance SOC activities to include threat hunting, red teaming, deception, malware analysis, forensics, and/or tabletop exercises, once incident response is mature. Any of these can improve the SOCs operating ability and increase the likelihood of finding more sophisticated adversaries.

🔗 Dedicated page

Cf. Management.

SOC metrics (KPI/SLA)

MITRE reference

Determine qualitative and quantitative measures to know what is working well, and where to improve. A SOC metrics program includes business objectives, data sources and collection, data synthesis, reporting, and decision-making and action

🔗 Dedicated page

Cf. SOC metrics (KPI/SLA)

HR and training

MITRE reference

Create an environment to attract the right people and encourage them to stay through career progression opportunities and great culture and operating environment. Plan for turnover and build a pipeline to hire. Consider how many personnel are needed for the different SOC functions.

🔗 Dedicated page

Cf. HR and training.

IT achitecture of a SOC

Have a single and centralized platform (‘single console’)

As per NCSC website:

Indications of an attack will rarely be isolated events on a single system component or system. So, where possible, having a single platform where analysts have the ability to see and query log data from all of your onboarded systems is invaluable. Having access to the log data from multiple (or all) components, will enable analysts to look for evidence of attack across an estate and create detection use-cases that utilise a multitude of sources. By creating temporal (actions over a period of time) and spatial (actions across the estate) use-cases, an organisation is better prepared to address cyber security attacks that occur system wide.

Disconnect (as much as possible) SOC from monitored environment

The goal is to prevent an attacker from achieving lateral movement from a compromised monitored zone, to the SOC/CSIRT work zone.

Enclave:

  • Implement SOC enclave (with network isolation), as per MITRE paper drawing: image

  • only log collectors and WEF should be authorized to send data to the SOC/CSIRT enclave. Whenever possible, the SOC tools pull the data from the monitored environment, and not the contrary;

  • on top of a SOC enclave, implement at least a level 2 of network segmentation;

SOC’s assets should be part of a separate restricted AD forest, to allow AD isolation with the rest of the monitored AD domains.

Endpoints hardening:

To go further

📚 Must Read

Essential resources to build, run, and mature your SOC/CSIRT.

Frameworks & Methodologies

Roles & Responsibilities

Threat Intelligence

Compliance & Regulations

Tools & Architectures

Use Cases & Implementations

📖 Nice to Read

Additional resources to expand your knowledge.

Standards & Controls

Cloud & Platforms

Incident Response

SOC Tools & Architectures

Benchmarks & Surveys

Miscellaneous Resources

SOC sensors, nice to have

Harden SOC/CSIRT environment

  • Implement hardening measures on SOC workstations, servers, and IT services that are used (if possible), e.g.:
  • Put the SOC assets in a separate AD forest, as forest is the AD security boundary, for isolation purposes, in case of a global enterprise’s IT compromise
  • Create/provide a disaster recovery plan for the SOC assets and resources.
  • Implement admin bastions and silo to administrate the SOC env (equipments, servers, endpoints):
    • My advice: consider the SOC environment as to be administrated by Tier 1, if possible with a dedicated admin bastion. Here is a generic drawing from Wavestone’s article (see Must read references): image
    • Recommended technology choices: Wallix PAM
    • Implement a level 3 of network segmentation
    • You may want to use throwable machines (virtual machines) for incident response or specific artefacts analysis. Here are my recommendations:

Appendix

License

CC-BY-SA

Special thanks

Yann F., Wojtek S., Nicolas R., Clément G., Alexandre C., Jean B., Frédérique B., Pierre d’H., Julien C., Hamdi C., Fabien L., Michel de C., Gilles B., Olivier R., Jean-François L., Fabrice M., Pascal R., Florian S., Maxime P., Pascal L., Jérémy d’A., Olivier C. x2, David G., Guillaume D., Patrick C., Lesley K., Gérald G., Jean-Baptiste V., Antoine C., David Q., Philippe M., …

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